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ABSTRACT
This paper offers several contributions for separation of duty
(SoD) administration in role-based access control (RBAC)
systems. We first introduce a new formal framework, based
on business perspective, where SoD constraints are analyzed
introducing the activity concept. This notion helps organi-
zations define SoD constraints in terms of business require-
ments and reduces management complexity in large-scale
RBAC systems. The model enables the definition of a wide
taxonomy of conflict types. In particular, object-based SoD
is introduced using the SoD domain concept, namely the set
of data in which transaction conflicts may occur. Together
with the formalization of the above properties, in this pa-
per we also show the effectiveness of our proposal: we have
applied the model to a large, existing organization; results
highlight the benefits of adopting the proposed model in
terms of reduced administration cost.
1. INTRODUCTION
Role-based access control (RBAC) [2] is a well known and
recognized good security model for enterprise access control
management. Central to the model is the role concept (a set
of access permissions) with users assigned to roles based on
duties to fulfil. One of the main benefits related to adopting
the RBAC model is the abstraction level introduced by a
role. Roles help organizations manage complex structures
and large number of identities and permissions within their
IT systems. Indeed, a role represents an intermediate layer
between permissions (typically managed by IT staff) and
users (typically managed by business staff). This helps or-
ganizations prevent users from accessing information at their
own discretion. In this sense, the role is a business concept
although not the only one to be considered when addressing
access control. Other business elements, such as business
processes or organization structure, should be included in
the overall access control model. To date only a few im-
plementations extend the RBAC model with other business
properties.
Another important benefit related to RBAC is represented
by its simple security administration. RBAC is universally
recognized as a policy-neutral access control model in the
sense that using hierarchies and constraints, a wide range of
security policies can be expressed, including discretionary
access control (DAC), mandatory access control (MAC),
and user-specific access control [6, 14]. Among all possi-
ble aspects of security policy, separation of duty (SoD) is
probably the most important. Alternatively indicated as
“conflict of interest” or “mutual exclusion”, SoD usually
refers to the identification of operations which should not
be granted to an individual user. For instance, an employee
acting as a financial manager may not be allowed to act
as a financial auditor at the same time. There are several
types of frameworks proposed in literature for SoD adminis-
tration [1,4,7,9,10,17,18, 20,21]. Nevertheless, when thou-
sands of users, roles, and permissions have to be managed,
such frameworks do not scale well, so that administering
SoD in large-scale RBAC systems is still quite challenging.
Moreover, existing frameworks do not leverage business ele-
ments to simplify the SoD administration in complex envi-
ronments.
This paper describes a new framework for administer-
ing separation of duty constraints, particularly suitable for
large-scale RBAC systems. The framework is based on the
following steps: first, the business processes are decomposed
into business activities; this may be entirely done by busi-
ness staff. Then, access permissions supporting all the ac-
tivities are identified by IT staff. Potential conflicts among
activities are also provided, again by business staff, leverag-
ing a business perspective. Such information is used to com-
pute conflicts among RBAC entities—permissions, roles and
users. We show how the proposed model offers a natural way
to define SoD constraints and to reduce management com-
plexity in large-scale RBAC systems. The proposed model
allows a wide taxonomy of conflict types; in particular, we
introduce the SoD domain concept as the set of data in
which transaction conflicts may occur. Introducing SoD do-
mains makes it possible to easily define more expressive con-
straints such as object-based separation of duty. Finally, we
have applied the proposed model on real data from a large
organization. Results confirm that our proposal greatly re-
duces the administration cost required to manage RBAC
systems.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion 2 offers a survey of state of the art as for SoD constraint
and role administration techniques. Section 3 summarizes
the main RBAC concepts needed to formally analyze the
problem. Section 4 provides a theoretical analysis of the
problem, introducing both the activity and the SoD domain
concepts. Section 5 offers a trivial usage example of the pro-
posed model. Section 6 shows an application of the model to
a large, actual organization. Finally, Section 7 offers some
final considerations.
2. RELATED WORK
Separation of privilege is one of the founding principles
for the protection of information according to Saltzer and
Schroeder [16]. Further, Clark and Wilson [3] identified sep-
aration of duty as one of the two major mechanisms that
can be implemented to ensure data integrity. At the policy
level, processes can be divided into steps, with each step
being performed by a different agent.
Several attempts to formally define separation of duty
constraints can be found in literature, especially in role-
based access control [4,9,17,18]. Simon and Zurko [20] pro-
vide a comprehensive classification, enumerating the differ-
ent kinds of conflicts. Kuhn [7] proposes mutual exclusion of
roles as a separation of duty mechanism; SoD requirements
are categorized according to the time mutual exclusion is
applied. Also Nyanchama and Osborn [10] describe a way
to implement various types of conflicts; they evaluate the
effect of role hierarchies in terms of their role-graph model.
Ahn and Sandhu [1] define the RSL99 language for specify-
ing separation of duty constraints.
All the aforementioned works are mainly based on the
core RBAC entities, namely permissions, roles, sessions, and
users, missing other business elements. Yet, since SoD is a
business requirement, other business aspects affecting SoD
are expected to be identified. For instance, although a user’s
privileges are often granted based on the tasks the user is
expected to fulfill, the concept of tasks is usually not explic-
itly modeled in access control [5]. Perelson and Botha [15]
provide a solution for the specification of static separation
of duty requirements in role-based workflow environments.
The authors identify the impact of SoD on work process
models. Then they extend the typical RBAC model to in-
clude the notion of task. Although tasks are taken into
consideration during conflict analysis, they are not used as
elements for defining conflicts. Likewise, Irwin et al. [5] in-
troduce the task concept as a means to determine users’
privileges and use tasks to define some security properties.
Other works attempt to highlight the importance of business
information in role-based access control, but they princi-
pally address role administration and definition, not always
considering SoD. For example, Oh and Park [12] highlight
how, in real implementations, users must have permissions
to complete a task. Their T-RBAC model [11] is an example
of RBAC extension that introduces “task” as a business con-
cept. Schaad and Moffett [19] propose the Alloy language
to model organizational control principles, such as those ex-
pressed in separation of duty, supervision and delegation.
While other important frameworks for administering RBAC
systems strive to include business elements as well [10,13,22],
SoD administration based on a modeling of business is not
always provided.
3. BACKGROUND
This section offers some of the concepts in the RBAC
model [2] that will be used in the following. The entities of
interest for the present analysis are:
• PERMS, the set of all possible access permissions;
• USERS, the set of all system users;
• ROLES ⊆ 2PERMS , the set of all roles;
• UA ⊆ USERS × ROLES, the set of all role-user rela-
tionships;
• PA ⊆ PERMS×ROLES, the set of all role-permission
relationships;
• RH ⊆ ROLES × ROLES, the set of hierarchical rela-
tionships between roles.
The symbol “” indicates an ordering operator representing
a path of direct relationships in RH . If r1  r2, then r1 is
referred to as the child or the senior of r2. Similarly, r2 is
the parent or the junior of r1.
The following functions are also provided:
• ass users : ROLES → 2USERS to identify users assigned
to a role and to none of its senior roles, according to
UA.
• ass users∗: ROLES → 2USERS to identify users assigned
to a role or to at least one of its seniors, according to
UA and RH .
• ass perms : ROLES → 2PERMS to identify permissions
assigned to a role and to none of its senior roles, ac-
cording to PA.
• ass perms∗: ROLES → 2PERMS to identify permissions
assigned to a role or to at least one of its seniors, ac-
cording to PA and RH .
In applying dynamic security policies, the session concept
should be taken into account. Each session identifies the set
of active roles for a given user. A user may be associated
with multiple sessions at any moment in time. This fea-
ture supports the principle of least privilege; that is, a user
assigned to multiple roles may activate any subset of these
roles to perform his/her tasks. This may be used in support
of dynamic separation of duty policies. According to the
RBAC standard, the function session roles : SESSIONS →
2ROLES identifies the set of active roles for the user associated
to the given session.
Finally, note that according to the standard, a permis-
sion is an abstract concept that refers to the arbitrary bind-
ing of operations and objects. This means that elements
of PERMS are actually pairs 〈o,m〉, where o ∈ OBJS indi-
cates the object andm ∈ OPS the way in which the object is
accessed—where OBJS and OPS indicate, respectively, the
set of objects and operations monitored by the access con-
trol system. In this paper permissions are always considered
as a single unit, except when referred to SoD domains (see
Section 4.4), where objects are used to group permissions.
4. MODEL DEFINITION
This section illustrates a new SoD model, where conflicts
are not directly defined among permissions or roles, but
among business activities. The rationale is that large com-
panies typically have hundreds of thousands of permissions
and roles, while possessing only a few hundred activities.
Therefore, managing activities is often easier than manag-
ing other RBAC entities. Tasks are a natural way to think
about user actions and their contexts [5], making the identi-
fication of users performing conflicting activities more intu-
itive than the identification of users assigned to conflicting
roles or possessing conflicting permissions.
Most of the existing SoD models are characterized by
defining conflicts among permissions or roles. For instance,
Kuhn [7] proposes mutual exclusion of roles (i.e., roles which
should not be simultaneously assigned to a user) as a separa-
tion of duty mechanism. But defining SoD conflicts among
roles could lead to inconsistent constraint definitions. This
is because user’s capabilities are vested in permissions, not
roles. For instance, suppose we have roles r1, r2, and r3
where only r1 and r2 are specified as being mutually ex-
clusive. However, r2 and r3 might be assigned with the
same permission set (i.e., ass perms∗(r2) = ass perms
∗(r3))
or, more generally, they might share the same permissions
which generate conflicts with role r1 (i.e., capabilities pro-
vided by ass perms∗(r2)∩ass perms
∗(r3) are conflicting with
capabilities provided by ass perms∗(r1)). According to this
observation, both pairs {r1, r2} and {r1, r3} would provide
a user with the same conflicting permissions. While no user
could be assigned to both r1 and r2 at the same time, a user
could be simultaneously assigned to r1 and r3 since these are
not defined as conflicting at the role level, tough providing a
user with equal conflicting permissions. This illustrates how
defining conflicts among roles can easily lead to ill-defined
SoD constraints or, even worse, allows to entirely bypass
other constraints.
According to the previous observation, the correct ap-
proach should be to define conflicting permissions, namely
sets of permissions which should not be simultaneously pos-
sessed by the same user. If permission conflicts are known,
it will be possible to deduce role conflicts: conflicting roles
would be those having conflicts in the union of their assigned
permissions. Therefore, specifying conflicts among permis-
sions provides a finer granularity as opposed to specifying
conflicts at the role level. Yet, in large organizations there
could be hundreds of thousands of permissions, leading to an
unmanageable situation. Besides this, it is usually difficult
to find a user within the organization who has both the busi-
ness and the IT knowledge required to identify conflicting
permissions.
In order to reduce complexity of SoD constraint descrip-
tion, we propose an alternative approach where conflicts are
not directly defined among permissions or roles. Before ex-
plaining how the proposed model addresses this problem, it
is necessary to introduce the activity concept.
4.1 Business Activities
Activities are identified by decomposing business processes
of an organization. From an access control point of view, an
activity is a set of permissions necessary to perform a cer-
tain task. In this sense, the activity and role concepts are
similar in that they both group permissions, but do have
some important differences:
• Meaning. Roles group permissions to be assigned to
a user in order to support the work he/she has to do,
but do not always directly map to specific business ac-
tivities. Some roles having no business meaning could
simply be defined out of convenience. For example,
when the hierarchical RBAC model is adopted, a so
called “connector role” represents the intersection of
permissions assigned to all the derived roles; but the
connector role may have no business meaning. Ad-
ditionally, some RBAC implementations offer a way
to define IT and business roles. Business roles are
typically established by the business (e.g., Employee,
President, Trader, etc.) whereas IT roles are estab-
lished by the application owners (e.g., admin, user,
auditor, etc.). In these systems, it is expected that
mapping business roles to IT roles would simplify pol-
icy specification. In such case, IT roles exist only to
reduce the overall system administration effort, while
business roles could allow to perform more than one
business activity.
• Cardinality. A typical large-scale organization could
have thousands of roles defined in its access control
system, while having no more than a few hundred busi-
ness activities. In any organization, activities depend
on company objectives, not organizational structure
or headcount. For instance, suppose two sales man-
agement roles na_sales_mgr and emea_sales_mgr are
assigned different permission sets as they are related
to different markets. Despite the need for two distinct
roles, they likely allow the same kind of activities to be
performed. While new roles are created in response to
new sales markets, no new activities will be required.
Thus, working with activities instead of roles (when-
ever the problem permits this replacement) allows an
organization to better address its growth.
• Abstraction. A role is defined to manage permissions,
while an activity is a business concept independent
from permissions. Activity constraints could be identi-
fied by business staff who have no knowledge of access
control. Instead, the role constraint definition could
require a joint effort between business and IT.
4.2 Activity Concept Formalization
Activities are obtained by decomposing business processes
into more elementary components, resulting in a tree struc-
ture formally described as follows:
• the set ACTVT contains all activities obtained by de-
composing business processes;
• the set ACTVT-H ⊆ ACTVT×ACTVT defines a par-
tial order on the hierarchy tree; 〈ap, ac〉 ∈ ACTVT-H
means that the activity ap is the parent of the activity
ac, also represented by ac → ap;
• the activity tree has only one root;
• ∀a ∈ ACTVT, the activity a has only one direct par-
ent, namely ∀ap, ac ∈ ACTVT : ac → ap =⇒ ∄a
′
p ∈
ACTVT, a′p 6= ap : ac → a
′
p.
Activity hierarchy is described using the concept of gen-
eralization, that is, using an “is-a” relation [8]. Given two
activities ap, ac ∈ ACTVT, then ac “is-a” ap indicates that
ap is more general than ac. This relationship, represented
with the notation ac → ap, also defines a partial order; thus,
ac  ap indicates the existence of a hierarchical relationship
pathway of “→” from ac to ap. Note that, without loss of
generality, it is always possible to individuate a unique root
for a set of activities; for example, a virtual activity “col-
lecting” all the high level activities of the organization could
be always defined.
Each activity is supported by sets of permissions, which
allow activities to be performed. To obtain a greater level
of flexibility, the permission grouping concept has been in-
troduced into the model. Instead of assigning permissions
directly to activities, permissions are first grouped into one
ore more subsets. For a user to perform a given activity,
such user must have all the permissions associated to at
least one activity-related grouping. This models situations
where harmful activities are not defined by a single action.
If a user is assigned all the permissions of a grouping, it is
possible to assert that the user performs the activity associ-
ated to such a grouping. More precisely, a set of permission
groupings is attached to each activity and can be formalized
as follows:
• GRPS ⊆ 2PERMS represents the possible permission
groupings which can be assigned to activities.
• ACTVT-G ⊆ ACTVT × 2GRPS expresses the origin of
a permission grouping in a given activity.
The function actvt grps : ACTVT → 2GRPS provides the set
of groupings associated to an activity. Given an activity
a ∈ ACTVT, it can be formalized as
actvt grps(a) = {g ∈ GRPS | ∃〈a, g〉 ∈ ACTVT-G}.
The previous function can be extended to takes into account
the activity breakdown structure, namely
actvt grps
∗(a) = {g ∈ GRPS | ∃a′∈ ACTVT : a′ a,
〈a′, g〉 ∈ ACTVT-G}
provides all the groupings assigned to a and its children.
Notice that activities and groupings can be seen as special-
ization of roles. In particular, assume the role entity is en-
riched with a new attribute making a distinction among reg-
ular roles, activities, and groupings. Therefore, ACTVT ⊆
ROLES and GRPS ⊆ ROLES, ensuring that elements in
ACTVT and GRPS are unassignable. Similar to users as-
signed to hierarchical-related roles, a user performing an ac-
tivity could also perform all parent activities in the activity
tree. Moreover, the set PA will be used to assign permissions
to groupings, while RH will be used to define the activity
structure with groupings as leaves of the tree. Constraint
formalization and mechanisms defined for roles may also be
used among activities and groupings.
The following sections formalize SoD conflicts within the
model. Because of the analogy between roles and activities,
such definitions can be directly derived from SSD (Static
Separation of Duty) and DSD (Dynamic Separation of Duty)
constraint definitions of [2].
4.3 Conflict Definition
Potential SoD conflicts are identified among activities,
namely from a business perspective. The set SoD-G ⊆
2ACTVT × N, describing activity conflicts, is a collection of
pairs 〈A,n〉 where each A is an activity set, while n ≥ 2. No
user should perform more than n−1 activities in A for each
〈A,n〉 ∈ SoD-G. Since activities are hierarchically related,
users should not perform neither activities in A nor parent
activities of A.
An observation key is that, since activities identify permis-
sion sets, it is possible to derive conflicting permissions from
conflicting activities. For example, let us assume the activi-
ties “Invoice Creation” and “Invoice Approval” conflict; fur-
ther, assume permissions { new_inv1, new_inv2, new_inv3 }
are needed to complete the activity “Invoice Creation” and
{ app_inv1, app_inv2 } to complete the activity “Invoice
Approval”. Thus, there should not be any user possess-
ing permissions { new_inv1, new_inv2, new_inv3, app_inv1,
app_inv2 } since these permissions allow users to perform
conflicting activities, namely creating and approving an in-
voice by oneself. Based on this observation, the following
are different kinds of conflicts among RBAC entities that
can be identified when adopting the proposed model.
Conflicting and illegal permissions. Permissions conflict
when they allow execution of conflicting activities. Formally,
given a set P ⊆ PERMS, permissions in P conflict if the
following holds:
∃〈A,n〉 ∈ SoD-G, ∃A′⊆ A : |A′| ≥ n =⇒
∀a ∈ A′, ∃P ′⊆ P : P ′∈ actvt grps∗(a). (1)
When |P | = 1, the permission p ∈ P is illegal, meaning that
the permission allows the execution of conflicting activities
by itself. This happens whenever an application does not
allow the execution of different activities recurring to differ-
ent functionalities (e.g., the application offers only one func-
tionality for the “Invoice Creation” and “Invoice Approval”
activities).
Conflicting and illegal roles. Roles are conflicting when
the union of their assigned permissions allow execution of
conflicting activities. Formally, given a set R ⊆ ROLES,
roles in R conflict if the following holds:
∃〈A,n〉 ∈ SoD-G, ∃A′⊆ A : |A′| ≥ n =⇒
∀a ∈ A′, ∃P ′⊆
S
r∈R ass perms(r) :
P
′∈ actvt grps∗(a). (2)
When |R| = 1, the role r ∈ R is illegal, namely it con-
tains conflicting or illegal permissions. In order to consider
the role hierarchy, Equation 2 can be easily extended us-
ing ass perms∗(r) instead of ass perms(r). Note that Equa-
tion 2 is derived from Equation 1 by substituting the set of
all conflicting permissions P with the union of permissions
assigned to roles in R.
Conflicting and illegal users. Users conflict when the
union of permissions assigned to their roles allows execution
of conflicting activities. Formally, given a set U ⊆ USERS,
users in U conflict if the following holds:
∃〈A,n〉 ∈ SoD-G, ∃A′⊆ A : |A′| ≥ n =⇒
∀a ∈ A′, ∃P ′⊆
S
r | ∃u∈U : u∈ass users(r) ass perms(r) :
P
′∈ actvt grps∗(a). (3)
When |U | = 1, the user u ∈ U is illegal, namely it is as-
signed to conflicting or illegal roles. In order to consider
the role hierarchy, Equation 3 can be easily extended using
ass perms∗(r) instead of ass perms(r), and ass users∗(r) in-
stead of ass users(r). Note that Equation 3 is derived from
Equation 1 by substituting the set of all conflicting permis-
sions P with the union of permissions assigned to users in
U through their assigned roles.
Equation 3 does not take into account sessions and can
thus be used only for static SoD constraint definition. As far
as dynamic SoD is concerned, given a session s ∈ SESSIONS
the previous equation can be modified as follows:
∃〈A,n〉 ∈ SoD-G, ∃A′⊆ A : |A′| ≥ n =⇒
∀a ∈ A′, ∃P ′⊆
S
r∈session roles(s) ass perms(r) :
P
′∈ actvt grps∗(a). (4)
According to the RBAC model, a session is related to a
single user. In order to consider role hierarchy, the previous
equation can be easily extended using ass perms∗(r) instead
of ass perms(r).
4.4 SoD Domains and Constraint Taxonomy
The introduction of the activity concept allows flexible
categorization of several kinds of SoD constraints. For ex-
ample, the constraint taxonomy proposed in [20] can be ex-
tended recurring to the activity concept instead of the role
concept. The first class of constraints is represented by Op-
erational SoD : activities, to be considered conflicting, must
be completed in all their steps. Therefore, the users are
allowed to execute parts of, but not the entire set of con-
flicting activities. From an access control viewpoint, a step
is no more than a set of permissions [11, 12]. In our model,
this concept is mapped to permission groupings. If a partic-
ular order of execution is required, dynamic session-based
mechanisms might be implemented.
Another SoD constraint class is represented by the Object-
Based SoD specifying that a user cannot execute conflicting
activities on the same object. This kind of constraint is
usually not directly supported by RBAC implementations.
To support it, we introduce the SoD domain concept in our
model. For instance, a SoD domain is a set of data on which
a single user should not complete conflicting activities. If
a user can perform conflicting activities on different data,
then it is probably impossible to configure an illegal action.
A SoD domain can be a single row on a DBMS table, or
simply the set of all data accessed by a given application. As
mentioned in Section 3, a RBAC permission is represented
by a couple 〈o,m〉, where o indicates the object and m the
way in which the object is accessed. This means that given
a permission, it is possible to determine in which domains
the permission operates. Consequently, SoD domains can
be formalized as follows:
• SoD-D indicates the set of all SoD domains.
• SoD-D-OBJS ⊆ SoD-D× 2OBJS expresses the origin of
an object in a given SoD domain.
The function perm domains : PERMS → 2SoD-D provides
the set of SoD domains a given permission operates. This
can be computed from the sets SoD-D-OBJS and PERMS;
given p ∈ PERMS the function can be defined as:
perm domains(p) = {d ∈ SoD-D | ∃〈d,O〉 ∈
SoD-D-OBJS, ∃m ∈ OPS, ∃o ∈ O : 〈o,m〉 = p}.
To bring the SoD domain concept in the equations of the
previous section, it is required that all conflicting permis-
sions must be confined within the domains contained in set
D. Therefore, Equation 1 (conflicting and illegal permis-
sions) becomes
∃〈A,n〉 ∈ SoD-G, ∃A′⊆ A, ∃D ⊆ (2SoD-D\{∅}) : |A′| ≥ n
=⇒ ∀a ∈ A′, ∃P ′⊆ P : P ′∈ actvt grps∗(a),
T
p∈P ′ perm domains(p) = D. (5)
Similarly, Equation 2 (conflicting and illegal roles) becomes
∃〈A,n〉 ∈ SoD-G, ∃A′⊆ A, ∃D ⊆ (2SoD-D\{∅}) : |A′| ≥ n
=⇒ ∀a ∈ A′,∃P ′⊆
S
r∈R ass perms(r) :
P
′∈ actvt grps∗(a),
T
p∈P ′ perm domains(p) = D. (6)
Equation 3 (conflicting and illegal users without sessions)
becomes
∃〈A,n〉 ∈ SoD-G, ∃A′⊆ A, ∃D ⊆ (2SoD-D\{∅}) : |A′| ≥ n
=⇒ ∀a ∈ A′, ∃P ′⊆
S
r | ∃u∈U :u∈ass users(r) ass perms(r) :
P
′∈ actvt grps∗(a),
T
p∈P ′ perm domains(p) = D (7)
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Figure 1: Graphical representation of the SoD
model
while Equation 4 (conflicting and illegal users with sessions)
∃〈A,n〉 ∈ SoD-G, ∃A′⊆ A, ∃D ⊆ (2SoD-D\{∅}) : |A′| ≥ n
=⇒ ∀a ∈ A′, ∃P ′⊆
S
r∈session roles(s) ass perms(r) :
P
′∈ actvt grps∗(a),
T
p∈P ′ perm domains(p) = D. (8)
Although defining SoD domains at the object level allows
the finest granularity, the resulting complexity could be un-
manageable, hence preventing its application. To dominate
the curse of complexity, it is often sufficient to define a do-
main as the set of all data accessed by an application or
set of applications. Most of the time, using the applica-
tion to identify data sets provides assurance that users are
prevented from executing conflicting actions. It is impor-
tant to highlight that different data does not necessarily
mean different domains. In fact, the same data can belong
to multiple SoD domains; moreover, working on one object
can have effects over other related objects. For this reason,
it would be too restrictive to say that permissions accessing
distinct objects cannot cause conflicts between one another.
Most of the time, defining SoD domains as all data accessed
by an application allows to correctly partition conflicting
permissions.
5. EXAMPLES
This section introduces some examples illustrating prac-
tical applications of the proposed SoD model. For this pur-
pose, Figure 1 shows a possible model instance, depicting
relationships among involved entities. It depicts some exam-
ple permissions (PERMS = {p1, . . . , p9}), roles (ROLES =
{r1, . . . , r9}) and the corresponding permission-role assign-
ments. The “aggregation” concept is used to assign permis-
sion sets to roles, while the “generalization” concept is used
in defining hierarchical relationships. For example, role r1
is a composition of permissions p1, p2, while role r6 is a
composition of permissions p1, p2, p3, p4, p5 since it is senior
of r1, r2, r3 from which it inherits permissions p1, p2, p4, p5.
The figure also shows how permissions are entirely managed
by IT staff, where role definition is a typical joint-task of
both business and IT people (sometimes represented by a
“security” staff).
Permission groupings (GRPS = {g1, . . . , g8}) are sim-
ply aggregation of permissions, while activities (ACTVT =
{a1, . . . , a10}) inherit permissions from groupings or other
activities. In the figure, activity a2 is performed when a
user possesses permissions p2, p4 (i.e., grouping g2) or per-
missions p3, p4 (i.e., grouping g3), namely actvt grps(a2) =
{g2, g3} = {{p2, p4}, {p3, p4}}. Instead, activity a10 is per-
formed when a user possesses p8 (through the hierarchical
relationship with a5 or a6) or p9 (directly through group-
ing g7). In fact, permission p8 allow not only execution of
activities a5, a6, but also activity a10. Similar to a role defi-
nition task, security staff are in charge of defining permission
groupings while activity tree identification is a typical task
for business staff.
Figure 1 shows two distinct domains (SoD-D = {d1, d2}).
For example, permission p6 is declared to operate in both
domains, that is perm domains(p6) = {d1, d2}, while per-
mission p2 operates in d1 but not in d2. Permission p1 is not
associated to any domain, thus it can never conflict with
other permissions; in fact perm domains(p1) = ∅ and any
equation from Sections 4.3 and 4.4 could be satisfied. In
the figure, s1 is a graphical representation of a possible SoD
constraint in SoD-G, stating that activities a2, a4, a10 can-
not be performed by the same user at the same time. Ac-
cording to Section 4.3, this can be formally represented by
the pair 〈{a2, a4, a10}, 3〉. Again, we emphasize the fact that
defining SoD constraints is a task for business staff.
Ignoring the SoD domain concept, 〈{a2, a4, a10}, 3〉 makes
r2, r5, r8 conflict because of Equation 2. In fact, role r2 is
assigned with permissions p2, p4, namely grouping g2, thus
supporting activity a2. Role r5 is assigned with permis-
sions p7, p8, p9, namely groupings g6, g7, g8, thus support-
ing activities a5, a6, a10. Note that role r5 allows partial
execution of activity a4, since permission p6 is needed to
complete grouping g5. Thus, role r8 is required to perform
activity a4. Role r8 is also assigned with permission p5 (in-
herited from role r3) thus allowing execution of activity a3,
that has no influence on the analyzed SoD constraint. Per-
missions p2, p4, p6, p7, p8, p9 are thus conflicting and any user
possessing them (i.e., roles r2, r5, r8) would be illegal.
Introducing SoD domains, roles r2, r5, r8 conflict in do-
main d1. In fact, permissions p2, p4, p6, p7, p8 can operate
in domain d1, while p9 cannot. Although activity a10 is
not directly supported by p8, both activity a5 and a6 sat-
isfy Equation 2 since a5  a10 and a6  a10. Similarly,
roles r5, r6, r8 conflict in domain d2.
Note that role r9 inherits permissions from r2, r8, thus
roles r5, r9 conflict. For the same reason, roles r5, r7, r8 con-
flict as well. If the previous SoD constraint is changed to
〈{a2, a4, a10}, 2〉, role r9 will be illegal. In fact, the con-
straint requires only two activities to be performed, so that
r5 is no longer needed to support a10. Adding the con-
straint 〈{a5, a6}, 2〉, permission p8 will also be illegal as well
as role r5.
6. TESTING ON REAL DATA
A large private company has been analyzed to highlight
the properties of the proposed SoD model. In particular,
the analyzed RBAC system is composed up of 90,287 users,
12,314 permissions (related to 67 different applications), and
16,755 roles.
In accordance to our framework, the business staff iden-
tified an activity tree containing 298 nodes. Upon this tree,
437 conflicting activity pairs were defined. To simplify the
definition of conflicts, only conflicting activity pairs were
considered, namely constraints having the form 〈A, 2〉 ∈
SoD-G. At the same time, 42,515 activity-permission re-
lationships were identified by IT professionals. To simplify
this task, it was divided among the owners of the 67 ex-
isting applications. Each owner analyzed only permissions
related to the administered application. In this way each
professional did not have to manage more than a thousand
activity-permission relationships. Further, one SoD domain
was defined for each application, since activities performed
by different applications adopted by the organization do not
access the same data set. Note that each identified activ-
ity was not necessarily performed recurring to one specific
application, namely within a single domain, but it could be
performed within different contexts, thus spreading across
multiple domains.
In such a scenario, only static SoD conflicts were iden-
tified. It was possible to deduce 4,555 illegal roles and
4,037,051 conflicting role pairs, discarding conflicts between
illegal and the remaining roles. As for roles, 2,566 illegal
permissions and 1,109,541 conflicting permission pairs were
identified, discarding conflicts between illegal and remaining
permissions. Finally, 7,047 users were found to be perform-
ing conflicting activities, potentially able to carry out illegal
actions. Without the adoption of the proposed SoD model,
such role and permission pairs should have been directly
defined, thus requiring more effort from both the business
and the IT staff. The results of this experimental activ-
ity can be summarized as follows: First, defining SoD con-
flicts through the activity concept reduced the number of
relationships to be managed, thus leading to a reduced ad-
ministration cost; in place of defining 4,036,908 conflicting
role pairs and 4,402 illegal roles, the proposed SoD model
required the definition of 437 conflicting activity pairs and
42,515 activity-permission relationships. Second, in our SoD
model the relationship identification task may be clearly di-
vided among business (responsible for activity conflicts) and
IT users (responsible for activity-permission relationships,
further separated among application owners). In most or-
ganizations it is unlikely the case where users can establish
by their own all possible conflicts among roles, since this
task requires a simultaneous good understanding of both IT
and business requirements related to such roles. Further,
new roles may be defined or existing roles may be reorga-
nized without requiring new SoD constraints nor affecting
the existing ones.
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper formalized a model that allows to analyze SoD
constraints adopting a business perspective. In particular,
potential SoD conflicts are defined among activities instead
of roles or permissions. In this way, it is possible to de-
fine SoD constraints in a more natural fashion, and to re-
duce problem complexity in large-scale RBAC systems. The
model also enables the definition of a wide taxonomy of con-
flict types. Object-based separation of duty is introduced
using the SoD domain concept—namely the set of data in
which transaction conflicts may occur. Experimental results
supported the viability of the proposed approach and con-
firmed all the claimed benefits.
To the best of our knowledge, this work represents the
first attempt to address SoD from a business perspective,
yet with an appropriate degree of formalization, that paves
the way for further research in the area.
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